The Venezuelan National Constituent Assembly met for the first time several days ago amidst a flurry of critical international commentary. The U.S. State Department issued a statement referring to the assembly as “the illegitimate product of a flawed process designed by the Maduro dictatorship to further its assault on democracy.” Opposition candidates were forbidden from participating in the election to form part of the Constituent Assembly, and the authoritarianism in Venezuela continues to increase. Other Latin American countries are concerned about increased violence throughout the region, and Venezuela has been excluded from several organizations of Latin American countries. I responded to these developments in my recent interview on Venezuela with RT News.
The economies of many Latin American countries are growing significantly for the first time in several years. This change is due to several factors, including increased market prices of commodities exported from the region as well as the strengthening of trade alliances within Latin America. This latter development is a result of U.S. President Donald Trump’s signaling of a protectionist path. In response to anticipated policies from Trump’s administration, Latin American countries are working to boost their relationships with non-U.S. trade partners.
Whether this growth is sustainable is yet to be seen. The deep and persistent inequality in most countries in the region is a significant obstacle, and major elections (both presidential and legislative) in many Latin American countries in 2017 and early 2018 will impact economic stability and growth as well.
Read my full report on the Geopolitical Intelligence Services website.
It comes as no surprise to those who attempt to follow the tracks laid down by Donald Trump in matters of foreign policy and national security policy that he has decided to reverse most, although not all, of the normalization efforts of the Obama administration and restore most, if not all, of the policy known as The Embargo. There were two broad hints of this change provided by Mr. Trump in the few months he has been in office. The first is that he cares not a fig for Latin America, so that the enormously positive impact in the rest of the hemisphere of Obama’s policy toward Cuba, and the powerful buttress to U.S. security in the region that such support represents, is of no moment to the current administration. In terms of national security, Latin America is little more than a bunch of countries that must be made to cooperate with U.S. efforts to uncover and contain international networks of criminal activity that might become linked to terrorist groups. In other words, national security policy in the hemisphere has become the handmaiden of the Department of Homeland Security.
The second reason Trump’s decision was foretold is the enormous influence the cabal of reactionary Cuban-American legislators has had in the transition and in the early months of the new government. 9 out of 10 advisers on Latin American affairs in the transition team across the entire range of cabinet offices were Cuban Americans, and all of these, without exception were acolytes of the Big Three in Congress – Diaz Balart, Ros Lehtinen, and Rubio. Trump had played up to this group during the campaign and has followed their advice since his inauguration. He announced the policy reversal in a speech in Miami on June 16.
What might be considered a bit surprising is that despite his harsh rhetoric about Obama’s policy, Trump actually left in place many of the key elements of that policy.
In doing so, Trump appears to have bowed to the demands of his national security team and his economic advisers. With regard to the first, the opening to Cuba immediately increased communication between the two countries concerning drug trafficking and other threats to U.S security in the Caribbean. As a result of that improved cooperation, Cuba was a positive factor in the eyes of Homeland Security. On the economic side, a complete rollback of the opening would have cost more than US$8billion and 14,500 jobs. That was a powerful argument in the White House debate over how to change the Obama policy.
Finally, the politics of Cuban policy have changed. While it is true that Trump values the loyalty of the Cuban-American members of congress, the political clout of that small cohort is not what it once was and is diminishing each year. Even among Cuban-Americans , more than 60% want to end the embargo. Curiously, that is not much different from the general population among which 65% support Obama’s opening, with those voting Republican actually a few points more favorable than those voting Democrat. Bills submitted for consideration this year in congress that deal with expanding travel and or trade with Cuba have broad bipartisan support, most notably the Flake-Leahy bill removing all travel restrictions to Cuba has 55 sponsors.
Given the way Trump deals with foreign policy issues, it may be irrelevant to point out that the embargo which he now claims to have restored, has failed completely and utterly over a 50 year period. Trump and supporters of the embargo claim that the Obama opening led to increased violations of human rights and a diminution of the space for public discussion in Cuba. In fact, the reverse is true. Over the past 25 years, Cuban state repression has spiked each time the U.S. government has ramped up its restrictions on Cuba, as if such repression were a demonstration by the Cuban government that U.S. pressure would not work. While the Cuban gerentocracy continues to restrict political freedom, there is no question that the period of opening, however brief, has brought a significant increase in entrepreneurial activity among Cubans and an increase in communication between Cuban citizens and counterparts overseas. What is most interesting is that pressure on the Cuban government to ease restrictions on its citizens is now coming from democratic governments in Latin America. Now, that is a major change and a change that must be credited to the Obama “deal” with Cuba.
President Mauricio Macri of Argentina was a successful businessman for many years before becoming the Mayor of Buenos Aires then the President of the country in 2015. He proposed plans to guarantee economic stability, but thus far the success has been moderate. Changes in the coming months, like increased prices for utilities and gasoline, will exacerbate the rising public discontent, and the position of the dissident Peronists will likely strengthen. Unrest is growing particularly quickly among particular sectors, like farmers, who were waiting for Macri to cut the tax on soy as promised. Now, there is no sign Macri will cut the tax, and this example illustrates a larger trend in the implementation of Macri’s economic plans. Read more in my recent report for the Geopolitical Intelligence Services, “Argentina’s Macri in the Crosshairs.”
Macri’s promise to revive the Argentine economy appears is late in coming to fruition. The first to go is the Economics Minister, Prat-Gay. Surprisingly, given his success in the Federal Capital, Macri is coming up short in gestion, the art of public administration at the national level.
In accepting the Nobel Prize for Peace, Santos called for a new approach for dealing with the traffic in illicit drugs. Good for him! Whoever “wins” the war on drugs, the Latin Americans continue to lose.
Trump’s early appointments raise the specter of a security focus on anti-terrorism and the potential threat of criminal networks. Very scary stuff.
Several weeks ago, I spoke with Veinte Manzanas from the online newsmagazine Nuevos Papeles about Donald Trump’s victory, what will come of his campaign promises, and implications for his foreign policy, given his lack of specificity about policies.
Read the published text of the interview in Spanish here.
I explain that his victory should not come as a complete surprise, considering the Republican Party is supported by around 40% of the electorate, thus, any candidate from their party will be competitive in an election. It is also important to acknowledge that his supporters are more than simply racist whites. Rather, Trump also appealed to voters who were angry with the current federal government. Many of his supporters are members of the working-class who have been increasingly discontented by globalization, the widening inequality gap, and the lowering of salaries for workers. Clinton did little campaigning in states where these groups of people dominate the electorate.
As for international relations, Trump’s supporters are not especially concerned with foreign policy. During his campaign, Trump broadly stated that the U.S. needed better relationships with their allies, but he did not elaborate specific policies. When he mentioned other countries, he highlighted Mexico, China, and the Middle East: he proposed building a wall at the U.S.-Mexican border; he declared that China is advancing more quickly than the U.S. and stated he intends to negotiate more aggressively with China; and he vilified the Middle East as the source of ISIS. Regarding relations with Latin America, the policies under Trump’s administration will be largely shaped by his advisors.
Venezuela seems stuck at the edge of the precipice. The press and many leaders in the region have been predicting disaster for months. As the deadlock between government and opposition continues, only the government appears capable of action as it continues to attack the opposition and to add to its power. Neither the opposition nor the international community has demonstrated the capacity to act.